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this remedy shows that due to the lack of remedy both at common law
and chancery, and due to the great demand for such a remedy, the
statutes were enacted. In the case of In re Ungaro, 88 N.J. Eq. 25,
IO2 Ad. 244 (1917), the court of chancery admitted it would have
been unable to construe wills and other written instruments prior to the
statute but that now such a declaratory remedy was available.
In the principal case the dissenting opinion is apparently well sup-
ported by authority in its position that the declaratory judgment was
purely a creature of statute and not within the inherent jurisdiction of
chancery. It is well settled in Ohio that the question of the appealability
of a case depends upon whether the basic principle of the statute is
equitable in character and based upon some equitable doctrine. Harper
& Kirschten Shoe Co. v. The S. & B. Shoe Co., 16 Ohio App. 387
(1922). Clearly the basic principle and character of the declaratory
judgment statute is not equitable. Therefore the declaratory judgment
is not a chancery case and can not be appealed on both questions of
law and fact.
To have the appellate review of the declaratory judgment on law
alone will in no manner harm the effectiveness of the declaratory judg-
ment remedy or do violence to any sound principle of policy. On the
contrary it will better serve the declaratory judgment, the aim of which
is speed and simplicity in securing the relief sought, by avoiding a trial





The testatrix, Frances Helen Rawson, transferred personal property
to a trustee. With her consent and approval, a part of the income was
invested in certain "land trust" certificates. At her death, these formed
a part of the estate and the question was whether they passeed by the
will to the devisees of the real estate or to the legatees of the personal
property. The court, construing the will and declaring the rights of
certain beneficiaries, held the certificates passed as real estate to the
devisees named in the will. The judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The First NatI. Bank, Exr., v. Davis, 56 Ohio App. 388,
9 Ohio Op. 443 (1937).
Land trust certificates are a comparatively recent development of
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the ancient form of investment known as ground rent. The usual
method of creation is for the holder of the title to transfer it to a trustee,
natural or corporate, who then makes a long-term lease, renewable
forever, with a privilege of purchase. Certificates of beneficial interest
are issued and the holders become owners of a proportionate equitable
interest in real estate, entitled to a proportionate share of the proceeds
of the land, whether rent or purchase price, but with no share in the
management. For a general discussion of the subject see Goldman and
Abbott, Land Trust Certificates T'Vith Relation to Ohio Law, 2 Cin.
L. Rev. 255 (1928). The result is hardly distinguishable from a
Massachusetts or business trust created to deal in land, generally termed
a pure trust as distinguished from situations where a reservation of sub-
stantial control results in partnership liability. For examples of the form
of the certificates and declarations of trust see 3 Jones, "Mortgages,"
Secs. 2510-2527 (1928); Bogert, "Trusts and Trustees," V. 6, Secs.
112o-11o6 (1935).
As indicated by the principal case, the controlling factor is the
nature of the interest held by the cestui que trust or certificate holder.
That interest has become increasinly one in rem and is now substantally
equivalent to equitable ownership of the trust res, the cestui que trust of
course retaining certain in personam rights. Scott and Stone, Nature of
the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 Col. L.R. 269, 467 (1917);
Bogert, supra, V. I, Sec. 183. Since the certificate holder's interest is
an equitable interest in realty, the decision in the principal case follows
logically from early Ohio cases holding that equitable interests in land
are real interests and subject to the laws of descent relating to interests
in land. Lessee of Ivery v. Dufrees, 9 Ohio 145 (1839); Biggs v.
Bickel, 12 Ohio St. 49 (1861); Bolton v. Bank, 50 Ohio St. 290,
33 N.E. 1115 (I893).
The nature of the certificate holder's interest is especially important
in the field of taxation, under the general principles that tangibles are
assessed by the law of the situs, intangibles by the law of the domicile of
the owner, and that the courts will be reluctant to tolerate double taxa-
tion. Hicks, Nature of the Right of a Cestui Que Trust with Particular
Refercnce to Taxation, 2 O.S.L.J. 321 (1936); Bogert, supra,
V. 2, Sec. 262, 263. In Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct.
8oo, 79 L. Ed. 1520, oo A.L.R. 794 (1935) the Supreme Court
held that an attempt to tax the holder's interest in the certificate as an
intangible was an improper tax on the realty, although measured by a
percentage of the income. It had been previously indicated in Ohio that
holders of land trust certificates were not required to list them for taxa-
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tion. 1926 Atty. G. Op. 375. However, it seems the income is dearly
subject to the federal income tax as "income from fiduciaries" and also
to a state income tax levied on it as such and not as a property tax. The
Supreme Court recently held income from rents of land taxable to the
recipient at the place of his domicile although the land is located outside
the state. People v. Graves, 300 U.S. 3o8, 57 Sup. Ct. 466, 8i L.
Ed. 666 (i937). The holder is thus subject neither to personal property
taxes, since he has an interest in realty, nor to real property taxes, since
they are paid by either the trustee or lessee. Land trust certificates are
properly included in an estate tax, and subject to inheritance, succession,
or death transfer taxes in the state where the land lies. Bates v. Probate,
131 Me. 176, x6o Ad. 22 (1932); Baker v. Commissioner, 253
Mass. I3O, 148 N.E. 593 (1925); Peabody v. Stevens, 215 Mass.
129, 102 N.E. 435 (1913); Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112,
55 Sup. Ct. 29, 79 L. Ed. 228 (i934).
In some cases, the intent of the parties has been given weight and
they have been allowed to control the nature of the property by a clause
in the trust agreement providing that the holder's property is to be
treated as personal property for all purposes and that he shall have no
interest in the realty held by the trustee. Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill.
528, i53 N.E. 68 (1926); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324 111. 319, i55 N.E.
323 (1927). The same result has been reached by necessary implica-
tion from the trust agreement. In re Stephenson's Estate, 171 Wis.
452, 177 N.W. 579 (1920).
Since a trust means equitable ownership in the property held by the
trustee and the certificate holder is therefore an equitable owner of
realty, it seems extremely doubtful that the parties can control the ques-
tion of the holder's interest by mere agreement, although the result
might be a practical one. In order to regard the corpus of the trust as
personalty for purposes of taxation, the doctrine of equitable conversion
has been invoked in the case of business trusts where there is mixed
personalty and realty or specific directions to sell the realty. Bates v.
Probate, supra; Dana v. Treasurer, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 941
(1917); Priestley v. Treasurer, 230 Mass. 452, 120 N.E. oo (1918);
In re Stephenson's Estate, supra., Massachusetts has refused to apply it
where the trust res consists entirely of realty, despite the expressed inten-
tion of the parties to regard it as personal property. Baker v. Commis-
sioner, supra. But it seems impossible to apply it to land trusts where
there is only an option of purchase and the trustee merely collects income
for the certificate holders. Bogert, supra, V. 2, Sec. 25 o . This is especi-
ally true in Ohio where the conversion takes place at the time of exercis-
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ing the option and will not relate back to the time of the execution of the
lease. Smith, Adm'r. v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N.E. i59
(I893).
The holder is obviously not concerned with recordation, the title
being in the name of the trustee. Land trust certificates are transferable
upon surrender to the trustee and the issuance of a new certificate to the
transferee, but are not negotiable, being subject to the terms of the trust
agreement on their face. It has been held that a "spendthrift statute"
does not apply to a business land trust. Baker v. Stern, 194 Wis. 233,
216 N.W. 147 (1927). The same construction of similar statutes
will remove the principal obstacle to alienability. However such a trans-
fer, it seems, is the conveyance of an interest in land and so subject to
provisions requiring a written memorandum and a formal writing for
the conveyance itself. Bogert, supra, V. i, Sec. i9o; Bartlett v. Gill,
221 Fed. 476 @ 485 (915). Thus in Ohio the transfer would be
governed by Ohio G. C., Sec. 862o-862i, and the signature in the
spaces provided on the certificate would seem to be sufficient compli-
ance. It is submitted that compliance with Sec. 85 10, providing for the
signatures of two witnesses and an acknowledgment by the grantor,
is not essential since the section expressly refers to a deed, mortgage, or
lease of any estate or interest in real property. And under Sec. IO5O2-I
a release of dower by the spouse of the transferor is not required. Such
certificates as are held at death would form a part of the estate and be
governed by descent and distribution. See Sec. 10503-4.
'Vhile the holder's interest is not subject to legal execution, it seems
clear that it can be reached by proceedings in aid of execution under
Sec. I I7 6 o et seq.
Regulation under "blue sky" and similar laws appears desirable in
the usual case of the large land trust. Ohio has held "membership re-
ceipts" in an association entitling the owner to a pro rata share in earn-
ings and profits are subject to such regulations, in accordance with the
tendency to regard business trusts as more and more like corporations
for purposes of regulation and taxation. Groby v. State, IO9 Ohio St.
543, 143 N.E. 126 (1924). The Ohio Attorney General has ruled
that land trust certificates representing an interest in land in other juris-
dictions should be qualified for sale in the same manner as foreign real
estate, 1926 Atty. G. Op. 528; that anyone selling such instruments
should be licensed as a real estate broker, 1929 Atty. G. Op. 1664;
and that certificates of beneficial interest of a common law trust should
be qualified under the Ohio Securities Act before being sold in Ohio
by a licensed dealer in securities, 1931 Atty. G. Op. 992. Rhode Island
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has held "mineral deeds," technically conveying interest in Texas
realty, are securities under a statute requiring the sellers to register as
brokers. State v. Pullen, 192 Atl. 473 (1937). The Securities Ex-
change Act includes in its definition of security. "a certificate of interest
or participation in any profit sharing agreement," 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 7 7 b,
and regulation under the act has been extended to participation trust
certificates in producing oil royalties. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion v. Jones, 12 Fed. Supp. 210 (1935). Reversed on other grounds
in 298 U.S. I, 56 Sup. Ct. 654, 8o L. Ed. 1015. Similar regulation
of land trust certificates appears plausible, since we really have a business
entity separate and apart from the certificate holders, and especially
since the land held in trust is frequently located in several states. See,
for example, the land trusts involved in Senior v. Braden, supra.
There is little other mention of land trust certificates, as such, in
Ohio. Ohio Gen. C. Sec. 710-140 (d) permits banks to invest funds
in land trust certificates under certain restrictions. Curiously enough,
the attorney general ruled that in assessing the shares of a bank for
taxation, county auditors could not include land trust certificates in the
deduction for real estate under Ohio Gen. C. Sec. 5412, the result
being an apparent double taxation. 1926 Atty. G. Op. 565, 1929 Atty.
G. Op. 1121.
So while there is little reported authority directly in point, the field
seems fairly well marked out by references to certain other fundamental
principles. It appears we could have avoided confusion and uncertainty
and reached a more practical result by regarding the certificates as more
nearly analogous to shares of stock. After all, while the certificate
holder has certain rights, he never expects to share in the realty, he ex-
pressly waives his right to partition in the usual arrangement, he some-
times stipulates that his interest shall be personalty-why not regard
him as having merely a bundle of choses in action, standing in a position
similar to that of a corporate stockholder? Yet the authority we have
is contra to such a position and the conclusion that his interest is that of
an equitable owner of realty is in keeping with sound legal theory as to
the nature of the cestui que trust's interest.
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